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JURISDICTION
This appeal is brought before the Utah Court of Appeals as of
right

pursuant

to Rule

3(a) of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure. This appeal is taken from a final order dated March 31,
1995 (R 286-287) in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Utah in a domestic matter.

The Notice of Appeal was filed April

28, 1995. (R 288)
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Do the facts support a finding that Plaintiff and Mr.

Hunter were residing together within the meaning of 30-3-5(6) UCA
and paragraph 13 of the Decree of Divorce?
a)

Standard of Review:

question of fact and law.

The issue in this case is a mixed

Consequently, the appeals court is not

bound by the conclusion of the trial court. Haddow vs. Haddow, 707
P2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985).

Furthermore, the appeals courts in Utah

are vested with broad equitable powers in divorce actions when
reviewing a trial courts decision.

Haddow, supra see also Read vs.

Read, 594 P.2d 871,872-73 (Utah 1979).
b)

The issues raised in this appeal were raised in the trial

court, being

substantive

rather

preserved for appeal.

3

than

technical, and

are

thus

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The provisions of § 30-3-5(6) UCA are determinative of this
case.
"(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to
a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the
party paying alimony that the former spouse is residing
with a person of the opposite sex.

However, if it is

further established by the person receiving alimony that
that relationship or association is without any sexual
contact payment of alimony shall resume."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case.
This is a domestic action wherein Defendant (Robert Pendleton)
seeks to be relieved
Plaintiff

from the obligation to pay alimony to

(Joyce Pendleton) arising from a Decree of Divorce

entered March 5, 1991 in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt
Lake

County,

State

presiding. (R 178)

of

Utah,

the

Honorable

Kenneth

Rigtrup

Robert Pendleton alleges that alimony should

terminate by reason of Joyce Pendleton's cohabitation, as set forth
in said Decree at paragraph 13:
"

13.

. . . The defendant is ordered to pay alimony

until the death of the plaintiff, the remarriage of the
4

plaintiff, cohabitation of the Plaintiff, or further
order of this Court." (R 176-177)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Robert Pendleton filed a Petition for Termination of Alimony
on the 26th day of October, 1993.

(R 233)

Plaintiff was served

with a Summons and the Petition for Termination of Alimony on
December 12, 1993. (R 240) Plaintiff, by counsel, filed an Answer
to Petition for Termination of Alimony on or about January 14,
1994.

(R 247)

There were no motions for temporary relief.

Defendant's Petition for Termination of Alimony was tried to the
Honorable Judge Kenneth Rigtrup on January 27, 1995 without a jury.
The court made it's Findings of Fact from the bench.

An order

dismissing Defendant's Petition for Termination of Alimony without
prejudice was entered on March 31, 1995. (R 286-287)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Joyce and Robert Pendleton were divorced March 5, 1991. Joyce
was awarded various marital property and monthly alimony.

"The

Defendant is ordered to pay alimony until the death of the
Plaintiff, the remarriage of the Plaintiff, cohabitation of the
Plaintiff, or further order of this court," (paragraph 13 of the
Decree of Divorce), emphasis added. (R 176-177)
In August, 1993, Robert became aware that Joyce had entered
into a relationship with Bill Hunter and it appeared by September,
5

1993 that Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter were cohabitating
together at her residence.

Robert Pendleton thereupon filed his

Petition for Termination of Alimony and commenced payment of the
alimony amounts into an escrow account pending the outcome of that
petition. (R281-282)
At trial, the Court found and Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter
testified that they had commenced a sexual relationship in July of
1993 which relationship continued to early February, 1994.

(R

282, Findings of Fact 3) It is noteworthy that the depositions of
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter were taken by Robert Pendleton's
attorney on January 26, 1994. (R 294,324) Joyce Pendleton and Bill
Hunter testified that there was a hiatus in their relationship
during the period February, 1994 through July, 1994 but that their
relationship had resumed by August, 1994. (R 282, Findings of Fact
3, 4)
Joyce and Mr. Hunter testified, and the court found, that
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter spent most of their free time
together.

(R 303 L3 - L5)(R 282, Findings of Fact 5)

When Bill

Hunter was in town, they spent the nights together at her home, or
his apartment. (R 386 L25 - 387 L17) Joyce Pendleton is self
employed as a beautician (R 332 L23 - 333 L3) and Bill Hunter is
a sales agent for a Salt Lake real estate brokerage. (R 304 LI L2)
6

Bill Hunter was separated, but not divorced from, his wife,
Janet Hunter.

(R 283, Findings of Fact 14)

He testified that

during the hiatus period, approximately February through July,
1994, he followed Janet Hunter and their minor children to Montana,
but traveled to Salt Lake frequently. (R 400 L10 - L19)
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter testified that they had plans
to marry (R 403 LI - L4; R 370 LI - L4; R 339 L 23 - L25; R 311 L24
- 312 L8) evidencing an intent to continue the relationship.

They

ate meals together (R 282, Findings of Fact 6) and shared some
expenses, particularly when they traveled out of town together. (R
340 L25 - R343 L5) (R 283, Findings of Fact 12)

The court found

that Bill Hunter frequently purchased their meals when they ate out
but that Ms. Pendleton provided the groceries when they ate at her
residence.

(R 282, Findings of Fact 6) (R338 L21 - L23, R 343 L6 -

R 344 L15, R 3070 L7 - L20)
It was undisputed that Bill Hunter kept some clothing and his
briefcase at Ms. Pendleton7s home. (R 366 L3 - 367 L22; R 282,
Findings of Fact 7; R 337 L9 - L21) It is further established that
Joyce Pendleton did some laundry for Bill Hunter and took some of
his clothes to the dry

cleaners, for which she paid but was

reimbursed. (R 282, Findings of Fact 8)

Bill Hunter had his own

key to Joyce Pendleton's residence. (R 301 L 17 - L23) He came and
went whether or not Joyce was there, and frequently left for work
7

directly from her residence after spending the night there. (R 447
L6 - L14; R 283, Findings of Fact 9) Joyce Pendleton had a key to
Bill Hunter's apartment (R 301 L22 - L23) as well as keys to Bill
Hunter's cars, and the use of his car for a period of time.

(R 376

L6 - L23)
Bill Hunter provided evidence that he rented an apartment by
a lease dated one day prior to the filing of Robert Pendleton's
Petition.

(R 283, Findings of Fact 10, transcript P17 L15-20)

During the course of these proceedings, he kept some of his
personal belongings at the apartment, some at the home of his
estranged wife, some in his car and some at the home of Joyce
Pendleton.

(R 447, L20-24)

Mr. Hunter testified that he spent

only one or two hours per day at the apartment.
395 L15 - 396 Lll)

(R 312 LI3 - L21,

He spent four to five days per week at Joyce

Pendleton's (R 344 L13 - LI4; R 300 L23 - R301 L4)
Mr. Hunter used his apartment, rather than Joyce's home, as
a mailing address.

(R 283, Findings of Fact 11)

Neither Joyce Pendleton nor Bill Hunter was financially
dependent on the other.

Both were self supporting adults at the

commencement of their relationship.

They did not open any joint

bank accounts or incur any joint obligations.
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter attended gatherings of her
family as a couple.

(R 340 L3 - L12; R 314 L20 - R 315 L2)
8

During the pendency of these proceedings, no alimony payments
were made to Joyce Pendleton nor did she make any demand for
payment or initiate
obligation.

any

action

for the

enforcement of that

(R 432 L25 - 433 L9)

The trial court found that the case turned on the issue of
"residence" as opposed to "cohabitation". (R P445 L25 - P446 L4)
Particularly, the court found that the term "residence" connotes
"some sort of duration".

(R P446 L6 - 10)

The trial court also

noted that there was minimal financial contribution from Bill
Hunter to Joyce Pendleton.

(R 449 LI7 - 21)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter resided together within the
meaning of § 30-3-5(6) U.C.A.

In this fact sensitive case, the

details of the relationship between Joyce Pendleton and bill Hunter
clearly support a finding that they had established a joint
residence, which continued for 8 months, was interrupted by Robert
Pendleton's efforts to terminate alimony, but had resumed on a more
circumspect basis several months before trial.
The relationship was open and notorious; there was sharing of
finances and household duties, of bed and board, free access to the
shared

residence

and

an

avowed

relationship, and to someday marry.
9

intention

to

continue

the

Joyce Pendleton made no attempt to defend on the basis of lack
of

sexual

contested.

contact;

this

element

of

cohabitation

was

never

Nor did Joyce Pendleton excuse the relationship by

raising a Knuteson defense.

Joyce Pendleton characterizes her

relationship with Bill Hunter as "dating".
II
Plaintiff' cohabitation was the type of abuse of alimony that
the legislature sought to address.
Utah's statute, unique in the country, terminates alimony for
residing with a member of the opposite sex, if sexual contact is
a

part

of

that

relationship,

consequences of the relationship.

regardless

of

the

financial

The continuing sexual aspect o

this relationship satisfies the requirement of "cohabitation" as
set forth in the Decree of Divorce.

Proof of "residence", to

satisfy the statute is less precise.
Utah#s lawmakers were concerned that divorced spouses, whose
right

to

receive

alimony

would

end

on

remarriage,

were

circumventing the statute by entering into de facto marriages, i.e.
residing together. The state intends that behavior consistent with
marriage be grounds to terminate alimony.
There is limited Utah case law on this issue, but cases from
other jurisdictions are helpful, to show that the relationship in
this case is sufficient grounds for termination of alimony.
10

ARGUMENT I
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter resided together
within the meaning of § 30-3-5(6) U.C.A.
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(6) which allows for the automatic termination
of alimony in cases where the receiving spouse is residing with
another person requires a bifurcated analysis. First, the statute
demands that the former spouse seeking to stop support payments
prove that the receiving spouse is "residing with a person of the
opposite sex".
Once

the

Wacker vs. Wacker,

residence

of

the

person

688 P2d (Utah 1983) at 534.
of

the

opposite

sex

is

established, the burden then shifts to the receiving spouse to
prove that the relationship is without sexual contact.

Wacker

supra.
The term cohabit or cohabitation is defined as: "dwelling
together, intercourse together as husband and wife, living or
abiding or residing together as man and wife".

Reside means to

"[l]ive, dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain, lodge".

Blacks Law

Dictionary 1308 (6th Ed., 1990).
The term "reside" implies that not only must the person stay
but that there be some continuity to the relationship ("to dwell
permanently or continuously.")

In Knuteson vs. Knuteson, 619 P2

1387 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the provision
for the first time in 1980.

The court held that the statute did
11

"not appear to cover a temporary

stay at another's home."

Knuteson, supra at 1389. Citing to Webster's New Twentieth Century
Dictionary, 2d Edition, the court defined the term as "[t]0 dwell
permanently or for a length of time; to have a settled abode for
a time."

Knuteson, supra at 1389. (emphasis added)

In Knuteson, supra the supporting spouse, Mr. Knuteson, had
refused to pay the court ordered alimony and thus Mrs. Knuteson was
unable to maintain her basic utility services. She moved into the
home of a male neighbor for less than three months, but immediately
moved back out as soon as she was able to collect monies owed to
her. Justice Henroid relied in his decision not only on the short
term of the arrangement, but on the misconduct of the payor spouse,
in causing the emergency, to deny relief from alimony.
In this case, no emergency existed, and alimony was paid until
the Petition was filed.
In a later case, Wacker vs. Wacker, 668 P2 533 (Utah 1983) the
receiving spouse on her own volition moved into the home of Dennis
Warr, a person of the opposite sex. The ex-wife had lived in that
home for three years when the ex-husband sought to terminate
spousal support.

While Warr and Mrs. Wacker lived together they

shared the cost of rent, utilities, and groceries. The trial court
refused to terminate alimony.
little

discussion

that

Mr.

The Utah Supreme Court held with
Wacker
12

had

met

the

burden

of

establishing residence, and because Mrs. Wacker testified that she
and Warr had had sexual relations, alimony was terminated.

Mrs.

Wacker apparently attempted a Knuteson defense, which was not
accepted.
In the instant case, Plaintiff and Hunter lived together from
September, 1993 to February, 1994.

The only time they did not

spend together was when he was out of town for business reasons.
Indeed, both Plaintiff and Hunter testified that their relationship
was not temporary and that they have discussed the possibility of
marriage.

Although Hunter does not help pay any of Plaintiff's

expenses, he enjoys the benefits of her home in which she has paid
the utilities and on occasion he dines on meals she prepared from
groceries that she purchased.

Moreover, Hunter admits that he

maintains some clothing at Plaintiff's home and that she routinely
does some of his laundry, making the facts similar to the situation
in Wacker. supra.

The relationship between Hunter and Plaintiff

demonstrates indicia of permanency as did the relationship between
Mrs. Wacker and Warr.

Unlike the receiving spouse in Knuteson,

Joyce Pendleton in the instant case resides with the person of the
opposite sex voluntarily.
Finally, like the receiving spouse in Wacker, supra Joyce
Pendleton in the instant case admits to having sexual relations
with Bill Hunter.

Thus, like Wacker, supra, Defendant in the
13

instant case has met his burden of establishing the residence of
Plaintiff with Hunter.

Plaintiff

has

failed

to rebut that

residence by proof of a "relationship without any sexual contact".
Therefore, the court of appeals should reverse the findings of
trial court and grant Defendant's petition to terminate Defendant's
obligation to pay alimony to Plaintiff.
Haddow vs. Haddow

707 P2 669 (Utah 1985) is the most recent

case discussing cohabitation.

The court notes that the term

"cohabitation" does not lend itself to a universal definition, and
follows the dictionary definition "to live together as husband and
wife" Haddow supra at 671 (Appellant asks, rhetorically, whether
there

is

any

limit

to

the

variety

of

husband

and

wife

relationships?)
In Haddow, the court states that common residency means the
sharing of

a common

abode that both parties

consider their

principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief time. Sexual
contact means participation

in a relatively

permanent sexual

relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and
wife, Haddow supra at 672.

Was Joyce Pendleton's residence also

Bill's principle domicile?

His car was not claimed to be his

domicile, nor did he claim to reside with his ex-wife during the
eight months from August, 1993 through February, 1994. Could his
apartment be his principle domicile?
14

He only went there for an

hour or two each day (R 395 L15 - 396 Lll), and rarely slept there,
perhaps once a week at which time Joyce accompanied him.
percent of the nights were spent at Joyce's home.
L14; R 370 16 - Lll)
(R 389 L12 - L25)
386 L18 - 25)

Ninety

(R 386 L25 - 387

He shared meals with her as often as possible

He dressed and left for work from her house (R

The very clothes he wore to court had been cleaned

for him by Joyce Pendleton (R 406 L6 -L9)

He used his key to come

and go from Joyce Pendleton's home as he pleased. (R 388 L 14 L18), R 397 L 18 - 20)

He parked a car at her home until December,

1994.

- L24; R

(R

391 L

20

376

L6

- L23) Clearly, Joyce

Pendleton's residence was Bill Hunter's principle domicile.
Importantly,

the

Court

in Haddow

stated

that

sharing

of

financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of a household
is not a requisite element of cohabitation, Haddow supra 673,
emphasis added.

In Haddow, supra, as in this case, the parties

largely bore their own living expenses although they shared some
food and laundry expenses, use of vehicles, and travel expenses.
The Court in Haddow, supra, also focuses on the issue of the
house key, citing an Iowa case, In re Marriage of Gibson Iowa
(1982) 320 NW2d 822, 823-824, to support it's finding that the
third party, who did not have a key, was not a resident, Haddow,
supra at 973 - 974. Appellant believes that it is very significant
that Bill Hunter had a key to Joyce Pendleton's house, that he came
15

and went on his own schedule and was on the premises when she was
not there.
The issue of residence, under Haddow, supra, is not determined
solely by the amount of time Bill Hunter spent at Joyce Pendleton's
home, but by other factors as well.

Although the nature of these

other factors is not defined, it is noted that a resident comes and
goes whether or not the co-resident was present; this occured.

A

resident has his/her own key; this occured, Haddow supra at 673.
The issue of continuity is clearly an important one. How long
a period of cohabitation is required to satisfy the statute? Three
months was too short in Knuteson, supra; three years was long
enough

in

Wacker,

supra.

In

Haddow,

fourteen

months

was

insufficient, but the third party almost always went back to his
separate residence to sleep, Haddow, supra 670-671, rather than
spending nearly all his nights, as in this case. In Haddow, supra,
proof of residency failed on the nature rather than the length of
the relationship.
Appellant submits that the trial court did not give sufficient
weight to the fact that the hiatus in their relationship occured
concurrent with Appellant's pressing of his suit, that Bill Hunter
and Joyce Pendleton had keys to the other's residence, that both
Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter express a continued desire to
marry, and that their relationship continued through the date of
16

trial.
ARGUMENT II
Plaintiff's Cohabitation was the type of Abuse of Alimony
That the Legislature Sought to Address
It was precisely this type of situation that the legislature
sought to prevent by enacting House Bill 188.

Prior to 1979 the

statute regarding the provision of spousal and child support
remained largely unchanged from it's original 1898 form.

Alimony

was traditionally terminated upon the remarriage of the receiving
spouse.

43rd Legislature, Utah House of Representatives, Floor

Debate, Disc. no. 5, February 26, 1989 morning session.

In the

past in Utah, social mores had prevented cohabitation between a
receiving spouse and a person of the opposite sex.

However, by

1979, society no longer inhibited cohabitation and as a result,
the legislature was concerned that supporting spouses were left
paying support despite the receiving spouse entering into a de
facto marriage. Id. The sponsor of the provision, Representative
Pace, stated

during

the debate

in the Utah

State House of

Representatives that the purpose of the new law was to establish
a public policy that if a couple choose to "share the bed", then
they must "share the board", supra. The intent of the legislature
in enacting paragraph 3 of House Bill 188 was to allow courts to
grant supporting spouses relief from alimony when the receiving
17

spouse choose to live with a person of the opposite sex "under
conditions consistent with marriage". Id.
In

the

instant

case,

Plaintiff

and

Hunter

live

under

conditions consistent with marriage. The couple have an exclusive
dating relationship and socialize only with each other. They spend
the majority of their nights together and enjoy an intimate sexual
relationship.

Plaintiff gave Hunter a key to her home.

Although

he continued to maintain his own apartment, he spent very little
time there.

He kept a few items of clothing at Plaintiff's home.

Plaintiff did some of Hunter's laundry and occasionally cooks for
him as well.

Although Hunter is still married to his estranged

wife, he and Plaintiff have discussed the possibility of marrying
one another in the future.
permanent relationship.

This is evidence of an on-going,

It is not indicative of a temporary one.

In short, Plaintiff and Hunter share a de facto marriage. This is
the type of problem that the legislature sought to remedy when it
enact House Bill 188 in 1979. Accordingly, the trial court should
have granted Defendant relief from alimony.
The Utah statute concerning the automatic termination of
spousal support due to the receiving spouses residing with a person
of the opposite sex is unique among statutes of this nature across
the country. Only the Utah statute has a bifurcated scheme. Most
states analyze the problem of cohabitation or even remarriage as
18

evidence of a change in economic circumstances warranting the
continue obligation to pay alimony. See In re Marriage of Tower,
780 P. 2d 863, 867 (Wash. App 1989) (termination of alimony because
of cohabitation requires subsequent finding of substantial change
of circumstances); Allgood vs. Allaood, 626 P2d 1323. 1327 (Okl.
1981) (discussing the then recent amendment of Oklahoma statute to
terminate alimony for cohabitation based on a change in economic
circumstances); Dwyer vs. Dwyerf 825 P2d 1018, 1019-20 (Co. App.
1920) (C.R.S. 14-10-122

(1) & (2) terminates alimony only for

remarriage and change of economic circumstances); Matter of Re
Marriage of Bates; 733 P2d 1363, 1364 (Or.1987) (remarriage does
not terminate alimony per se^l.

Economic circumstances is not an

element of Utah's statute, Haddow, supra.
Some states have statutes that allow courts to terminate
alimony payments based on cohabitation of the receiving spouse with
a person of the opposite sex.

See Wilcoxson vs. Wilcoxsonf 498 So

2d 1238, 1238-39 (Ala.Civ.App. 1986) (citing Ala. Code §30-2-55
(1975) alimony may be terminated

upon proof

"that

[receiving]

spouse is living openly or cohabitating with a member of the
opposite sex 11 ); In re Marriage of Frasco. 638 N.E. 2d 655, 659
(111, App. 4 Dist, 1994) (citing 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40 para
510(c)) alimony is terminated "if the party receiving maintenance
cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal
19

basis").
In Frasco. supra, the ex-wife moved in with a friend nine
months after finalizing her divorce. Frasco, supra. Subsequently,
the pair opened a joint checking account for the payment of
household expenses. Each had their own bedroom and claimed to have
had no sexual relations with the other. They each shared household
chores.

Frasco, supra at 658.

The friend characterized their

relationship as "close friends" and during the entire time he
remained married to his wife who was committed to a nursing home
suffering from numerous debilitating diseases.

The ex-wife and

friend were constant companions, but ten months after the ex-wife
moved in the friend moved out because of the "legal harassment" and
surveillance by the ex-husband.

Still the couple remained close

and the friend spent holidays with the ex-wife and her family. The
ex-husband sought to terminate alimony based on cohabitation. The
trial court held that the relationship was more an economic
relationship like roommates that a resident, continuing conjugal
one.

The Illinois Court of Appeals Fourth District reversed the

trial court's decision, holding that the court had abused it's
discretion. Frasco, supra at 660. The court of appeals held that
the Illinois law required a showing of a de facto husband and wife
relationship to justify terminating spousal maintenance.
supra at 659.

Frasco,

The court held that the ex-husband need not prove
20

sexual relations between the pari in order to make a case of
cohabitation on a conjugal basis.

Frasco. supra.

Moreover, a de

fact husband and wife relationship could exist between the ex-wife
and friend even though he was still married.

Id. The court held

that the couple shared a domestic relationship that was nearly the
"traditional model of marriage".

Their relationship continued to

be close even after the friend moved out and it was reasonable to
presume that they would resume co-residency once litigation had
ended because that was the sole reason for his departure.
Frasco, supra at 659-60.

The court held that the case fell within

the purpose of the statute which was "to prevent a spouse from
achieving indirectly (by cohabitation on a resident, continuing
conjugal

basis),

remarriage)."

what

could

not

be

achieved

directly

(by

Frasco, supra at 660.

In McCluskey vs. McCluskey, 528 So2d. 328, 329 (Ala. Civ.App.
1988) the ex-wife (Barbara) and a man named Mr. Smith (Smith) did
not move in together.
two-thirds

of

their

However, they did spend about one-half to
nights together

McCluskey, supra at 329-30.

at

Barbara's apartment.

Barbara paid all of her own expenses.

Smith maintained his own apartment where he received all of his
mail.

Smith did not perform any chores at Barbara's apartment.

Smith did not move any personal property into Barbara's home except
a few clothes that he left on occasion.
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Barbara did none of

Smith's laundry. Barbara did not financially support Smith in any
way except for meals that she prepared for him when he spent the
evening at her apartment. Smith and Barbara periodically went on
vacation together and Smith paid the majority of the expenses
during these trips.

The pair frequently socialized together, and

although they did not tell

anyone that they

spent evenings

together, neither did they hid the fact. When they spent evenings
together they frequently had sexual intercourse.

After nearly a

year had passed from when this relationship began the ex-husband
(Fred) petitioned the trial court to terminate alimony. The trial
court

held

Barbara's

relationship

with

Smith

to

be

open

cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex in violation of Ala.
Code 30-2-55 (1975).

Therefore, the court granted Fred's petition

for relief from the obligation to pay alimony. On appeal the court
held that the party seeking to terminate the alimony must show that
the receiving spouse must be living openly or cohabitating with a
member of the opposite sex and that there must be a demonstration
of the permanency of the relationship.
trial court's decision.

The court affirmed the

Barbara and Smith had openly maintained

their relationship for nearly a year and during that time spent the
majority of their evenings together.

Both Barbara and Smith had

testified that they would continue their relationship.
court held that the ex-husband had met his burden.
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Thus, the
McCluskey,

supra at 331.
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has held in other cases
with facts similar to those in the instant case that termination
of alimony was proper.

See Kennedy vs. Kennedy, 598 So. 2d 985,

986 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (ex-wife lived with man for five years
with separate bedrooms and bathrooms, both denied sexual contact,
man did

not pay rent but did perform

household maintenance

services, and both shared expenses); Taylor vs. Taylor, 550 So.2d
996 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (ex-wife and man lived together and saw
each other exclusively

for six and one half months, he moved his

clothes into her home and she gave him a key, he helped with her
finances and shared in chores); Daniels vs. Daniels, 599 So.2d 1208
(Ala.Civ.App. 1992) (ex-wife moved in with man and lived with him
for seven years, she did not pay rent but performed household
chores instead, they did not have sexual relations, she paid for
half the utilities and he purchased a car which he registered in
his name and hers).
The facts of the instant case are nearly identical to those
in McCluskey, supra.

Plaintiff and Hunter shared no expenses.

Hunter has moved no personal property into Plaintiff's home other
than a few clothes.

Hunter received no mail at Plaintiff's home.

Also like McCluskey, Plaintiff and Hunter spent the majority of
their nights together.

When they spent their evenings together,
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they often shared their meals and had sexual relations.
and Plaintiff socialized exclusively with each other.

Hunter

They took

vacations together during which Hunter pays the majority of the
expenses.

Plaintiff has brought Hunter to family gatherings.

Importantly, both Hunter

and Plaintiff

claim that they will

continue their relationship after the litigation has ended. Thus,
like McCluskey. supra, Plaintiff and Hunter enjoy an open and ongoing relationship and all indications are that it is permanent.
Unlike McCluskeyf supra, Plaintiff gave Hunter a key to her
house.

Through this act, Plaintiff gave Hunter complete and

unlimited access to her home.

In a case interpreting the meaning

of the word "cohabitation" as used in a divorce decree the Supreme
Court of Iowa held that the most import single factor in their
conclusion that the ex-wife and male friend were cohabitating was
the man's "complete and unlimited access to" her home.

In Re

Marriage of Harvey, 466 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Iowa 1991).
Plaintiff and Hunter live together as de facto husband and
wife despite Hunter's continued married status with his current
wife, just like the ex-wife and her friend in Frasco.

Like the

couple in Frasco, Plaintiff and Hunter in the instant case share
a close relationship.

Hunter has done some projects around the

house and Plaintiff does some of his laundry. Although they do not
have a joint checking account for expenses as did the couple in
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Frasco, supra, Plaintiff and Hunter enjoy a complete and continuing
sexual relationship unlike the couple in Frasco. Importantly, the
law in Illinois and the law in Utah are similar and have the same
purpose:

"to prevent a spouse

from achieving

indirectly

(by

cohabitation on a residence, continuing conjugal basis), what could
not be achieved directly (by remarriage).11

Thus, Defendant urges

the court to reverse the trial court decision and grant Defendant's
petition for termination of alimony like the court did in Frasco.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals should grant Defendant's Petition for
Termination of Alimony and reverse the trial court's decision. The
Utah

statute

requires

an

initial

demonstration

"residing" with a person of the opposite sex.

of

Plaintiff

Residence involves

dwelling together and some sense of permanency in the relationship.
Defendant has successfully demonstrated this point and Plaintiff
cannot

rebut

the

residence

because

she

admits

to having a

continuing sexual relationship with Hunter.
The nature of the relationship between Hunter and Plaintiff
is essentially de facto husband and wife.

The legislature sought

to grant supporting spouses relief from alimony when the receiving
spouse engaged in a relationship that was in all other respects
marriage.

The relationship in the instant case is precisely that

type of relationship that the legislature was so concerned about.
25

States with statutes similar to Utah's have interpreted them
so as to terminate the obligation to pay alimony under facts nearly
identical to those in the instant case.

For these reasons

Defendant urges the court to reverse the trial court decision and
grant it's Petition to Terminate Alimony.
DATED this ^—- ;

day of August, 1995.

Kathryn Schuler Denholm
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
Appellant's

Brief

to

J.

Bruce

Reading,

Attorney

for

Plaintiff/Appellee, at 261 East 300 South #200, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 on this

C5

day of August, 1995.

Kathryn Schuler Denholm
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOYCE A. PENDLETON,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

ROBERT L. PENDLETON,

Case No. 904900500DA

Defendant.

:

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

The above matter came on for hearing before Judge Kenneth
Rigtrup on January 27, 1995.

The Plaintiff appeared in person and

with her attorney of record, J. Bruce Reading, and the Defendant
appeared in person and with his attorney of record, Kathryn S.
Denholm.

Upon the Defendant having rested his case in chief, the

Plaintiff brought a Motion for a Judgment based upon the fact that
Defendant had not met his burden of proof.

The Court, having heard

evidence and being fully advised in the law, enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Defendant filed a Petition for Termination of

Alimony in October 1993 requesting that Plaintiff's alimony be
terminated based upon Plaintiff's cohabitation.
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2.

On or about that date, Defendant stopped payment

alimony payments to the Plaintiff and, in lieu thereof, paid said
payments into a holding account.
3.

Joyce

Pendleton,

Plaintiff,

and

Bill

Hunter

commenced a sexual relationship in July 1993 which relationship
continued significantly and unabated through February 1994, a
period of eight months.
4.

Since August 1994 to the present time, Ms. Pendleton

and Mr. Hunter have established a fairly consistent pattern of
sexual relations.
5.

During the time period of July 1993 through February

1994, Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton spent most of their free time
together.
6.

During that eight-month period, Mr. Hunter and Ms.

Pendleton ate a few meals together and shared some expenses;
although it appears that Mr. Hunter bought most frequently when
they went out.

Mr. Hunter did eat meals free at Ms. Pendleton's

house when she did fix meals.
7.

Mr. Hunter had, on occasion, his clothes at the

house of Ms. Pendleton and occasionally he had a briefcase there.
8.

Ms. Pendleton did some token laundry for Mr. Hunter

and carried some of his dry cleaning to the cleaning establishment
next door.

Mr. Hunter reimbursed Ms. Pendleton

for the dry

cleaning that she had had done on his behalf.
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9.

Mr. Hunter shaved, showered, and prepared himself

for the day at her residence after having spent the night with Ms.
Pendleton.
10.

It appears that Mr. Hunter rented an apartment

approximately one

(1) day prior to the filing of Defendant's

petition; however, Mr. Hunter's wife and children were living in
the Magna area.

Some of his belongings were in that home, some of

his things were in his vehicle, and some items were at Joyce
Pendleton's.
11.

Mr. Hunter did not use Ms. Pendleton's residence as

a mailing address. Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton did not share any
assets or any financial arrangements of any kind except to the
extent

that

there

was

a nominal

sharing

of

a vehicle

for

transportation purposes.
12.

Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton did travel on several

overnight trips and there was some sharing of expenses during these
trips.
13.

The evidence is clear and unmistakable that Mr.

Hunter made no significant or casual contribution to Ms. Pendleton
for any household expenses.

He made no mortgage payments or

utility payments, and there was no commitment to do so.
14.

Janet Hunter now lives in Montana with the Hunter's

dependent children and Mr. Hunter maintains a marital relationship
with Janet Hunter.

Mr. Hunter is not presently divorced from his

wife, nor has he filed for divorce.
3
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The controlling law in this case is 30-3-5(6) of the

Utah Code wherein "alimony terminates upon the establishment by the
party paying alimony that the former spouse is residing with a
person of the opposite sex."
2.

The Court deems that some sort of duration to the

residency is necessary pursuant to Haddow v. Haddow, 702 P.2d 6669
(Utah 1985).
3.

"Residing" under the statute

4.

Residency

is different

from

duration,

some

domicile.
contemplates

some

continuity, some commitment to a shared, beneficial relationship.
5.

Neither Mr. Hunter nor Mr. Pendleton considered Ms.

Pendleton's home to be Mr. Hunter's principal place of residence.
Any sharing of a common residence was for a temporary period of
time and, therefore, is not residency as contemplated as required
by the statute.
6.

Although the Court finds that there have been sexual

relations such is not sufficient to meet the burden of the statute.
7.

The Court finds that the Defendant has not met his

burden of proof and concludes that the petition is without merit
and dismisses the same without prejudice.

4
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8.

Each party

will

be

responsible

for

their

own

attorney fees and costs.
DATED this

.£

*g( ^

day of March, 1995.

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true
and exact copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law to the following party on the

day of March, 1995:

Kathryn Schuler Denholm
Attorney for Defendant
-263 East 2100 3outh i3W3^ ^ °
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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TRANSCRIPT OF RULING FROM BENCH
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THE COURT:

We are not dealing in this case

15
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1

with cohabitation.

2

subparagraph 6 of the Utah Code Annotated, and the

3

driving concept is "residing."

4

determined.

5

paying alimony that the former spouse is residing with a

6

person of the opposite sex."

7

counsel as alluded to, that it is not defined by

8

definition.

9

duration as was alluded to by the Supreme Court in Haddow

10

We are dealing with 30-3-5,

That is the issue to be

"Terminates upon establishment by the party

And the difficulty, as

However, the term connotes some sort of

vs. Haddow.

11

In this particular case there is no dispute in

12

the evidence and so it is clear and without dispute that

13

Joyce Pendleton and Bill Hunter commenced a relationship,

14

including sexual relationships in July of 1993 and

15

continued significantly and unabated through February of

16

1994, a period of eight months.

17

reinstated a fairly consistant pattern of sexual

18

relations and contact from August of 1994 to present, a

19

period of six months.

20

That they have again

As indicated in Haddow vs. Haddow, we are not

21

just talking about sexual relations or physical contact.

22

There was no dispute, at least as to the first eight-

23

month period that Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton spent most

24

of their free time together.

25

on occasions, giving the hours that Ms. Pendleton spent

Although they ate together

16

in the beauty salon and the hours that Mr. Hunter spent
peddling real estate, they ate few meals together and
perhaps in that context shared some expenses, all except
he bought most frequently when they went out.

He ate

free at her house when she fixed meals.
It is clear and without dispute that the
pictures he had of his clothes at the house, on and off,
that he had a briefcase there.
laundry.

She did some very token

Carried some of his dry cleaning to the

cleaning establishment next door.

And Mr. Hunter

acknowledged that on occasion he shaved, but I suspect
that given the hours on the log when his car was there,
he was showering and brushing his teeth and the whole
nine yards in the morning.
The residence separate apartment.
rent

period

The first

was from October 25, 1993. The Petition to

Eliminate Alimony was filed October 26th.

So the rent

created was one day prior to the fi'l.ing of the petition.
So the Court is not pursuaded about the genuiness of that
lease agreement, but nonetheless during that same period
of time Mr. Hunter's wife and children were living in the
Magna area.

Some of his things were at that house, some

of the things were in his vehicle, and a few items were
at Joyce Pendleton's.
There is no evidence that Mr. Hunter used the
17
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Pendleton residence as a mailing address.

There is no

evidence that Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton shared any
assets or any financial arrangements of any kind, except
to the extent that there was nominal evidence about
sharing the vehicle for transportation purposes.
The only other sharing in this record is that
when they travelled on those several overnight trips,
there was some sharing of the expense.
With respect to the dry cleaning, the evidence
was that Mr. Hunter reimbursed Ms. Pendleton for the dry
cleaning she had done in his behalf.

The evidence is

clear and unmistakable that Mr. Hunter made no
significant or casual contribution to Ms. Pendleton for
the household expenses.

No mortgage payments.

No

utility payments and there was no commitment.
Although "residing" under the statute is maybe
to some extent different than "domicile."

It is

nevertheless a function to some extent of intention and
what is contemplated.

And in the Haddow case, the

relationship in question, though not quite as intense
over the period that the Court finds occurred during at
least August, September, October, November and into the
first part of the year, the Haddow relationship was one
24 I
25

of 14 months.
The evidence is silent as to when Janet Haddow
18

was located in Montana and that residence occurred.

The

evidence is without dispute that she now lives in Montana
with dependant children of Mr. Haddov's.

That he

maintains the marital relationship and has not divorced
his wife.

Has not filed for divorce and that there are

no contemplated plans.
The Haddow case defines "common residence"
indicating that the sharing of common wealth of both
parties consider their principal domicile for more than a
temporary or brief period of time.

They observed in that

case, that as well, there was sexual contact even if
extensive, it does not constitute cohabitation.
The significant thing in the Supreme Court's
mind and in this Court's mind, is that residency
contemplates some duration, some continuity, some
commitment to a shared beneficial relationship.
Something more than just sexual relations.

In this case,

although it wasn't a requirement about shared expenses,
there was some indication "Well, it ought not to be
considered."

In this case the Court really finds no

shared or financial commitments.
At page 674 the Supreme Court observed, "In
view of these circumstances, it is clear," is the
language they employed, "that neither appellant nor Mr.
Hudson considered appellant's home Mr. Hudson's first
19
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1

principal residence. "

2

It is difficult for the Court to conclude

3

otherwise given the fact that Mr, Hunter is still a

4

married man and is unattached, that he has made no

5

financial commitments that have been demonstrated to Mrs.

6

Pendleton and is not in the position, at least at this

7

point, to make those type of commitments.

8

The Court finds and concludes that the

9

residency requirement of the statute, the burden of the

10

proof, has not been met by the defendant; and concludes

11

that petition is without merit and dismisses the same

12

without prejudice.

13

No one raised the issue of fees, so I don't

14

have to worry about it, other than to say you made your

15

own bed, Ms. Pendleton.

You have

got to sleep in it.

16

Each party is to pay their own fees and costs.

17

MR. READING:

We have not received alimony

18

since the time of filing.

19

money be paid to us, together with fee interest at the

20

prejudgment rate at the present time?

21

THE COURT:

Could we have an order that

The issue is not before me and the

22

statement by counsel has been that those checks have been

23

paid to her office. I assume she has got it in her trust

24

account and can bring it current.

25

MS. DENHOLM:

Even though I think interest
20
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would not be appropriate.
MR. READING:

It is the standard.

It is

dismissed.
THE COURT:

I guess we could spend another 3 or

400 in rebuttal fees coming back.
work it out.
judgments.

I assume the parties can

The Court is not here to make moral

Whether it suits me or not is irrelevant. I

am bound to follow the decisions of the Appellate Court
of the state whether I personally agree or not.
MR. READING:

Thank you very much, Your Honor.

I will prepare those for the counsel's signature.
THE CORUT:

Very good.
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